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Sgt Copernicus H. Coffey

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Sgt Copernicus H. Coffey

Birth
Owen County, Indiana, USA
Death
29 Jun 1864 (aged 23–24)
Georgia, USA
Burial
Marietta, Cobb County, Georgia, USA GPS-Latitude: 33.9510269, Longitude: -84.5427322
Plot
9231
Memorial ID
View Source
First Sergeant in command of Company I 22nd Indiana Infantry. Mustered into service August 15, 1861. Re-enlisted as a Veteran to extend his service to the end of the war.

Mortally wounded at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain at what was to become known as Cheatham Hill, June 27, 1864. Died on June 29 and was buried at Kennesaw Mountain. His remains were later removed to Marietta national Cemetery. -according to the Indiana Adjutant General report.

Killed at Cheatham Hill. Listed as an Orderly Sergeant.

Copernicus H Coffey, Co I 22nd Indiana. Resident of Bloomington. Veteran; died June 29, 1864 of wounds.
-Indiana AG

Killed in battle of Cheatham Hill.
Listed as 1st Sergt Co I 22nd Indiana.

No. 145. Report of Capt. William H. Snodgrass, Twenty-second Indiana Infantry.
...On skirmish line near Big Shanty on June 14; lost 3 men wounded. On 19th took position in front of Kenesaw Mountain; had 1 man killed. On same line on 23d; had 1 man killed and 1 wounded. On night June 25 changed position to the right, and on 27th participated in assault on enemy's works near Marietta; loss, 1 commissioned officer killed and 2 wounded; enlisted men killed 11 [Mitchell, Dubois, Whitehorn, Niceley, Lock, Simmonds, Ellis, Clark, Hooker, Tallus, Martin], and 33 wounded [Coffey, Gibbs, Moss] and 4 missing.

No. 123. Reports of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis, U.S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations May 1=August 22. HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS
...The troops were intrenched and field-works thrown up for the batteries during the night. The troops remained in this position with but little change until the night of the 25th, during which time sharp skirmishing frequently engaged the infantry, and fierce artillery contests sprang up between the contending batteries. In these encounters our batteries invariably manifested their superiority and discipline over that of the enemy. My command, except the batteries, was relieved by a division of the Sixteenth Corps, of the Army of the Tennessee, and moved during the night to the rear of our lines and bivouacked during the 26th in rear of General Stanley's division, of the Fourth Corps, preparatory to storming the enemy's works at some point near that place on the following morning. Being informed by Major-General Thomas of the distinguished duty for which my division had been designated, in company with Generals Stanley, Brannan, and Baird, I made a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's works and selected the point of attack. The point selected was immediately in front of General Whitaker's brigade, of Stanley's division, of the Fourth Corps. The enemy's works here conforming to a projecting point in the ridge, upon which his works were built, presented a salient angle, and, in the absence of abatis, fallen timber, and other obstructions which generally confront their works, this point seemed the most assailable. Early on the morning of the 27th the brigade commanders accompanied me to the ground and familiarized themselves with it. McCook's and Mitchell's brigades had been designated for this conspicuous duty, and at 8 o'clock were massed in an open field in rear of our breast-works (now occupied by Morgans brigade as a reserve), some 600 yards from the point to be carried. No place nearer the enemy's line could the troops be massed without receiving the enemy's fire, both of infantry and artillery. The ground to be passed over was exceedingly rocky and rough, and a considerable part of it covered with forest trees, interspersed with undergrowth. The signal was given a little before 9 o'clock, and the troops, following the example of their admired leaders, bounded over our own works, in the face of the enemy's fire, and rushed gallantly for the enemy, meeting and disregarding with great coolness the heavy fire, both of artillery and infantry, to which they were subjected, until the enemy's works were reached. Here, owing to exhaustion, produced by the too rapid execution of the movement, the exceedingly rough ground and the excessive heat, the troops failed to leap and carry the works to which their noble daring and impetuous valor had carried them. McCook had fallen, dangerously wounded, and Harmon, next in rank, had assumed command, but fell immediately. Dilworth, the next senior in rank, promptly took command of the brigade, and with great personal gallantry held his command to the fierce contest now being fought so near the works that a number of both officers and men were killed and wounded at the trenches. Mitchell's brigade, moving in column parallel with McCook's, received and re- turned the fire with the same impetuosity and invincible determination, but failed, from the same cause, to carry the works. The position of the troops at this juncture was one of extreme solicitude, and presented a problem of some difficulty of solution. To retire, and thus receive the full effect of the enemy's unrestrained fire, now considerably diminished in severity by the effect of our own, was sure to incur an additional loss. A renewal of the assault in the present exhausted condition of the troops was exceedingly hazardous. Under the circumstances, after a thorough examination of the ground and the enemy's works, I reported to Major-General Thomas, and recommended that the position be held and the troops intrenched where they were. This he ordered to be done, and intrenching implements were immediately furnished the troops, and both brigades threw up works a few yards from and nearly parallel to those of the enemy. This was done under fire so severe that at times it might also be termed a general engagement. Works thrown up under such circumstances were of necessity of rude character, but sufficed to protect the men until night, during which the whole command intrenched itself in excellent works. During the succeeding six days the position was held, the troops sleeping on their arms at night. Details were kept engaged in throwing up new works where ever an advanced line could be established, until the morning of the 3d of July, when it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned the position. The assault failed in its immediate object, but the courage and discipline exhibited by the troops in the attack, the determined manner in which they clung to the works afterward, and the noble physical endurance displayed by them during the six days and nights, have never been exceeded in modern soldiery...

Parents and birth date and place provided by a descendant who has been researching the Coffey family.
First Sergeant in command of Company I 22nd Indiana Infantry. Mustered into service August 15, 1861. Re-enlisted as a Veteran to extend his service to the end of the war.

Mortally wounded at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain at what was to become known as Cheatham Hill, June 27, 1864. Died on June 29 and was buried at Kennesaw Mountain. His remains were later removed to Marietta national Cemetery. -according to the Indiana Adjutant General report.

Killed at Cheatham Hill. Listed as an Orderly Sergeant.

Copernicus H Coffey, Co I 22nd Indiana. Resident of Bloomington. Veteran; died June 29, 1864 of wounds.
-Indiana AG

Killed in battle of Cheatham Hill.
Listed as 1st Sergt Co I 22nd Indiana.

No. 145. Report of Capt. William H. Snodgrass, Twenty-second Indiana Infantry.
...On skirmish line near Big Shanty on June 14; lost 3 men wounded. On 19th took position in front of Kenesaw Mountain; had 1 man killed. On same line on 23d; had 1 man killed and 1 wounded. On night June 25 changed position to the right, and on 27th participated in assault on enemy's works near Marietta; loss, 1 commissioned officer killed and 2 wounded; enlisted men killed 11 [Mitchell, Dubois, Whitehorn, Niceley, Lock, Simmonds, Ellis, Clark, Hooker, Tallus, Martin], and 33 wounded [Coffey, Gibbs, Moss] and 4 missing.

No. 123. Reports of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis, U.S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations May 1=August 22. HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS
...The troops were intrenched and field-works thrown up for the batteries during the night. The troops remained in this position with but little change until the night of the 25th, during which time sharp skirmishing frequently engaged the infantry, and fierce artillery contests sprang up between the contending batteries. In these encounters our batteries invariably manifested their superiority and discipline over that of the enemy. My command, except the batteries, was relieved by a division of the Sixteenth Corps, of the Army of the Tennessee, and moved during the night to the rear of our lines and bivouacked during the 26th in rear of General Stanley's division, of the Fourth Corps, preparatory to storming the enemy's works at some point near that place on the following morning. Being informed by Major-General Thomas of the distinguished duty for which my division had been designated, in company with Generals Stanley, Brannan, and Baird, I made a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's works and selected the point of attack. The point selected was immediately in front of General Whitaker's brigade, of Stanley's division, of the Fourth Corps. The enemy's works here conforming to a projecting point in the ridge, upon which his works were built, presented a salient angle, and, in the absence of abatis, fallen timber, and other obstructions which generally confront their works, this point seemed the most assailable. Early on the morning of the 27th the brigade commanders accompanied me to the ground and familiarized themselves with it. McCook's and Mitchell's brigades had been designated for this conspicuous duty, and at 8 o'clock were massed in an open field in rear of our breast-works (now occupied by Morgans brigade as a reserve), some 600 yards from the point to be carried. No place nearer the enemy's line could the troops be massed without receiving the enemy's fire, both of infantry and artillery. The ground to be passed over was exceedingly rocky and rough, and a considerable part of it covered with forest trees, interspersed with undergrowth. The signal was given a little before 9 o'clock, and the troops, following the example of their admired leaders, bounded over our own works, in the face of the enemy's fire, and rushed gallantly for the enemy, meeting and disregarding with great coolness the heavy fire, both of artillery and infantry, to which they were subjected, until the enemy's works were reached. Here, owing to exhaustion, produced by the too rapid execution of the movement, the exceedingly rough ground and the excessive heat, the troops failed to leap and carry the works to which their noble daring and impetuous valor had carried them. McCook had fallen, dangerously wounded, and Harmon, next in rank, had assumed command, but fell immediately. Dilworth, the next senior in rank, promptly took command of the brigade, and with great personal gallantry held his command to the fierce contest now being fought so near the works that a number of both officers and men were killed and wounded at the trenches. Mitchell's brigade, moving in column parallel with McCook's, received and re- turned the fire with the same impetuosity and invincible determination, but failed, from the same cause, to carry the works. The position of the troops at this juncture was one of extreme solicitude, and presented a problem of some difficulty of solution. To retire, and thus receive the full effect of the enemy's unrestrained fire, now considerably diminished in severity by the effect of our own, was sure to incur an additional loss. A renewal of the assault in the present exhausted condition of the troops was exceedingly hazardous. Under the circumstances, after a thorough examination of the ground and the enemy's works, I reported to Major-General Thomas, and recommended that the position be held and the troops intrenched where they were. This he ordered to be done, and intrenching implements were immediately furnished the troops, and both brigades threw up works a few yards from and nearly parallel to those of the enemy. This was done under fire so severe that at times it might also be termed a general engagement. Works thrown up under such circumstances were of necessity of rude character, but sufficed to protect the men until night, during which the whole command intrenched itself in excellent works. During the succeeding six days the position was held, the troops sleeping on their arms at night. Details were kept engaged in throwing up new works where ever an advanced line could be established, until the morning of the 3d of July, when it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned the position. The assault failed in its immediate object, but the courage and discipline exhibited by the troops in the attack, the determined manner in which they clung to the works afterward, and the noble physical endurance displayed by them during the six days and nights, have never been exceeded in modern soldiery...

Parents and birth date and place provided by a descendant who has been researching the Coffey family.


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